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a b s t r a c t
We show the generic finiteness of probability distributions induced on outcomes by the Nash equilibria
in two player zero sum and common interest outcome games.1. Introduction
It has been established by Harsanyi (1973) that for normal
form games with an arbitrary number of players, if the payoffs
of the players can be perturbed independently, generically there
is a finite number of equilibria. Kreps and Wilson (1982) proved
the generic finiteness of equilibrium probability distributions on
the end nodes of an extensive form game. In games arising from
economic models, it may happen that different actions of the
players yield the same outcome. Thus, the scope of the above
results is limited to the extent that it does not generally hold for
outcome games.
Govindan and McLennan (2001) and Kukushkin et al. (2008)
have shownexamples forwhich there is a continuumof probability
distributions on outcomes induced by the Nash equilibria of the
associated game. A natural question that arises is to find out for
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normal and extensive form games continues to be valid.
Progress towards answering the above question has been
made by Govindan and McLennan (2001) who have proved the
generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for games with two
outcomes and any number of players. González-Pimienta (2010)
argues that the same result holds for games with two players and
three outcomes. Park (1997) has shown the generic determinacy of
equilibria for sender–receiver cheap-talk games.
Mas-Colell (2010) has shown that the equilibrium payoffs are
generically finite for two player game forms. In this note, we
combine Mas-Colell’s approach with elementary linear algebra
to show the generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions on
outcomes when the associated game is either a two player zero
sum or a common interest game. This result has already been
obtained, in a so far unpublished manuscript, by Govindan and
McLennan (1998) using semi-algebraic geometry techniques. The
interest of the present work lies on the fact that by relying only on
straightforward linear algebra, we are able to provide a fairly short
and elementary proof.
2. Common utility and zero sum outcome games with two
players
There are two players. Let S1, S2 be their sets of pure strategies.
We assume n = |S1| ≥ 1, m = |S2| ≥ 1 and let S = S1 × S2.1
Consider a finite set of outcomes Ω = {1, . . . , l}. We denote by
∆(Ω) the set of probabilitymeasures onΩ . An outcomegame form
is a function θ : S → ∆(Ω).
For each outcome j = 1, . . . , l, themapping θ defines a function
M j : S → R such that M j(sa, sb) is the probability that θ(sa, sb)
assigns to the outcome j ∈ Ω . We identify eachM j with an n× m
matrix with real entries. Given u = (u1, . . . , ul) ∈ Rl, we interpret
uj as the utility assigned to outcome j. To each u ∈ Rl we assign the
matrix
A(u) =
l
j=1
ujM j.
Given two profiles of utilities on outcomes u1, u2 ∈ Rl for the
players, the matrices A

u1

and A

u2

define a two-person game.
The strategies x ∈ ∆(S1) and y ∈ ∆(S2) of the players induce
a probability distribution on Ω . The probability that outcome j
occurs is given by xM jy.
A common utility game1 is a game in which u = u1 = u2.
We will write A(u) for common utility games. The purpose of this
work is to provide an elementary proof of the following result in
Govindan and McLennan (1998).
Proposition 2.1. There is an open dense subset G ⊂ Rl such that, for
every u ∈ G, the set of probability distributions on outcomes induced
by the Nash equilibria of the game A(u) is finite.
3. Proof of Proposition 2.1
The notation dp represents the vector (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rp. The
n × 1 matrix A u1 y is also interpreted as a vector in Rn. In the
expressionA

u1

y, we regard the vector y ∈ Rm as anm×1matrix.
Similarly, for x A

u2

. The scalar product of z, t ∈ Rp is written as
z · t . By At we denote the transpose of the matrix A.
The number of pure NE of a finite game is finite. By eliminating
those strategies that are played with zero probability, it is enough
to prove Proposition 2.1 for completelymixedNE. Given two utility
profiles u1, u2 ∈ Rl, if a pair of completely mixed strategies, x =
x

u2
 ∈ ∆(S1) and y = y u1 ∈ ∆(S2), is Nash equilibrium (NE)
of the game defined by A

u1

and A

u2

, then, they constitute a
solution of the following systems of linear equations
A

u1

y = αdn, y · dm = 1 (1)
xA

u2
 = βdm, x · dn = 1 (2)
for some α = α u1 ∈ R (the payoff of player 1) and β = β u2 ∈
R (the payoff of player 2). The proof is based on a detailed analysis
of the solutions of the above equations.
We will rely on the following fact shown by Mas-Colell (2010).
Let k = max{rank A(u) : u ∈ Rl}. There is an open, dense subset G
of Rl such that the following hold.
(a) rank A(u) = k, for every u ∈ G. After reordering, if necessary,
the strategies of the players, we may write A = A(u) as
A =

B C
D E

where B = B(u) is a k× kmatrix with det B ≠ 0.
(b) The functions rank (A(u)|dn) and rank

At(u)|dm

are constant
on G.
1 Our method applies as well to games for which u = u1 = tu2 , with t ∈ R \ {0}.
In particular, taking t = −1, Proposition 2.1 holds also for two-person zero sum
games.Let k1 = rank (A(u)|dn) and k2 = rank

At(u)|dm

, for any
u ∈ G. Note that k1, k2 ∈ {k, k + 1}. The argument will be carried
out by considering the possible values of k1 and k2.
Case 1: k1 = k2 = k.
First, remark that B−1(u) is defined for all u ∈ G. In all the
Lemmas that follow, it is assumed that k1 = k2 = k. Note also
that the matrices below depend on u.
Remark 3.1. Since,
k = rank B = rank

B C dk
D E dn−k

= rank
 B C
D E
dk dm−k

the remaining rows of the above matrices are a linear combination
of its first k rows. Therefore, there is an (n − k) × k matrix H and
a vector z ∈ Rk such that HB = D,HC = E,Hdk = dn−k, zB = dk
and zC = dm−k. Hence, H = DB−1, z = dkB−1. And we have that
DB−1C = E, DB−1dk = dn−k,
dkB−1C = dm−k, for every u ∈ G.
Fix now u¯1, u¯2 ∈ G. From now on, we assume that the game
defined by the matrices A

u¯1

and A

u¯2

has a completely mixed
NE. Later, we will consider the particular case of a common utility
game, u¯1 = u¯2 = u¯. However, this last assumption is not needed
in the lemmas below.
Lemma 3.2. There are open subsets U1,U2 of G such that u¯1 ∈
U1, u¯2 ∈ U2 and dkB−1(u)dk ≠ 0, for every u ∈ U1∪U2. Furthermore,
for u1 ∈ U1 and u2 ∈ U2, the systems of linear equations (1) and
(2) have a solution only for the following payoffs
α

u1
 = 1
dkB−1

u1

dk
, β

u2
 = 1
dkB−1

u2

dk
. (3)
Proof. Let α be the payoff of player 1 in the completely mixed NE
of the game A

u¯1

and A

u¯2

. Since Eq. (1) has a solution, we have
that
rank
 B C
D E
dk dm−k
 αdkαdn−k1

= rank

A
dm

= k.
Therefore, the last row of the above augmented matrix is a linear
combination of its first k rows. There is a vector z ∈ Rk such that
z B = dk and αz · dk = 1. Hence, z = dkB−1 and αz · dk =
αdkB−1dk = 1. It follows that dkB−1

u¯1

dk ≠ 0 and the payoff
of player 1 is α

u¯1

, where α is defined in Eq. (3) Consider the
polynomial
p(u) = det (B(u)) dkB−1(u)dk .
Since, p

u¯1
 ≠ 0, there is and open set U1 ⊂ G such that u¯1 ∈ U1
and p(u) ≠ 0 for every u ∈ U1. In particular, dkB−1(u)dk ≠ 0 for
every u ∈ U1. Moreover, the above argument also shows that, for
anyu ∈ U1, the only possible value ofα forwhich the systemof Eqs.
(1) has a solution is α(u), as given in Eq. (3). A similar argument,
using the payoff of player 2, determines the set U2 and the value of
β , the payoff of player 2. 
The following two lemma s restate the familiar procedure of
writing the general solution of a linear system as a particular
solution of the complete system plus the general solution of
the associated homogeneous system. The novelty here is in
showing that, near u¯1 and u¯2, we can express those solutions in
a differentiable manner.2
Lemma 3.3. There are differentiable functions α : U1 → R, yp :
U1 → Rm and yh : U1 × Rm−k → Rm such that for each u ∈ U1,
(i) A(u)yp(u) = α(u)dn, dm · yp(u) = 1.
(ii) A(u)yh(u, v) = 0, dm · yh(u, v) = 0, for every v ∈ Rm−k.
Proof. We split Rp as Rj × Rp−k. Accordingly, we will explicitly
write the action of each of the block matrices B, . . . , E of A, when
it acts on a vector inRn. For example, given z = (zk, zm−k) ∈ Rm =
Rm × Rm−k, we will write Az = (Bzk + Czm−k,Dzk + Ezm−k) ∈
Rn × Rn−k = Rn. Let α : U1 → R be given by Eq. (3). Define
yp : U1 → Rm and yh : U1 × Rm−k → Rm as follows
yp(u) = α(u)

B−1(u)dk, 0

yh(u, v) =
−B−1(u)C(u)v, v .
Since, det(B(u)) ≠ 0 on G, all the above functions α, yp and yh
are differentiable. By Remark 3.1, it follows that
Ayp = α

BB−1dk,DB−1dk
 = α(dk, dn−k) = αdn
dm · yp = αdkB−1dk = 1
and
Ayh =
−BB−1Cv + Cv,−DB−1Cv + Ev = 0
dm · yh = −dkB−1Cv + dm−k · v = −dm−k · v + dm−k · v = 0. 
Similarly, one can prove the following result.
Lemma 3.4. There are differentiable functions β : U2 → R, xp :
U2 → Rn and xh : U2 × Rn−k → Rn such that for each u ∈ U2 we
have,
(i) xp(u)A(u) = β(u)dmdn · xp(u) = 1.
(ii) xh (u, w) A(u) = 0, dn · xh (u, w) = 0, for everyw ∈ Rn−k.
Of course, not all the functions y

u1, v
 = yp u1 + yh u1, v
and x

u2, w
 = xp u2 + xh u2, w obtained from the above
lemma s correspondnecessarily to aNE. For this, onewould need to
check also that the coordinates of y

u1, v

and x

u2, w

are non-
negative and that these strategies constitute a best response to the
other player’s action.
The proof of Proposition 2.1 for the case k1 = k2 = k is now
a straightforward application of Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4. Using the
notation in those lemma s,we note first that, for

u1, u2
 ∈ U1×U2,
xh

u2, w

A

u1

yp

u1
 = α u1 xh(u2, w) · dn = 0.
Differentiating this expression with respect to u1j we obtain that
xh

u2, w
 
M jyp

u1
+ A u1 ∂
∂u1j
yp

u1
 = 0.
We consider now the particular case of a common utility game in
which u¯1 = u¯2 = u¯. Since, xh(u¯, w)A(u¯) = 0, when plugging
u1 = u2 = u¯ in the previous equation, it reduces to
xh(u¯, w)M jyp(u¯) = 0, for everyw ∈ Rn−k.
Similarly, we see thatxp(u¯)M jyh(u¯, v) = 0, for every v ∈ Rm−k.
On the other hand, differentiating A(u)yh(u, v) = 0 with respect
to uj and evaluating at u¯, we see that
0 = M jyh(u¯, v)+ A(u¯) ∂
∂uj
yh(u¯, v).
Multiplying on the left by xh(u¯, w), the second termvanishes. Thus,
0 = xh(u¯, w)M jyh(u¯, v) for every v ∈ Rm−k andw ∈ Rn−k.
Now, when player 1 follows the strategy x(u¯, w) and player 2
follows the strategy y(u¯, v), the probability that outcome j occurs is
x(u¯, w)M jy(u¯, v) = xp(u¯)M jyp(u¯)+ xp(u¯)M jyh(u¯, v)
+ xh(u¯, w)M jyp(u¯)+ xh(u¯, w)M jyh(u¯, v)
= xp(u¯)M jyp(u¯)
which, for a fixed u¯ ∈ G, is independent of v andw.
Case 2: ki = k+ 1 for some i = 1, 2.
Consider first the possibility that k1 = k + 1. The case k2 =
k + 1 is similar. Assume that for some u1, u2 ∈ G, the game
A

u1

, A

u2

has a NE in which player 1 uses completely mixed
strategy. This player must be indifferent among all his strategies.
Thus, the linear system (1) has a solution, for some α ∈ R. If
α ≠ 0, then dn is a linear combination of the columns of A, but
then k1 = rank (A(u)|dn) = k. Hence, α = 0.
Therefore, if k1 = k + 1, the payoff of player 1 vanishes in any
completely mixed NE of any game generated by utilities in G.
We claim that no common interest game generated by utilities
in G can have a completely mixed NE. Otherwise, there is u¯ ∈ G
such that the game A(u¯) has a completely mixed NE, say x ∈ ∆(S1)
and y ∈ ∆(S2). In this equilibrium, the payoff of player 1 is zero.
Since G is open, we can add a small enough, non-zero constant ε to
the utilities of the players and obtain a new game, say A(u¯+ε), also
generated by utilities from G. Since the payoffs of the games A(u¯)
and A(u¯+ ε) differ only by a fixed constant ε, they have the same
NE. In particular, x ∈ ∆(S1) and y ∈ ∆(S2) is also a completely
mixed NE in the game A(u¯ + ε), in which player 1 gets the payoff
ε, but this contradicts the above remark.
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